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INTERFACE DESIGN TO ACTUALIZE HUMAN-MACHINE COORDINATION
IN THE HIGHLY AUTOMATED COCKPIT
Daisuke Karikawa, Makoto Takahashi, Masaharu Kitamura
Graduate School of Engineering, Tohoku University
Sendai, JAPAN
Capt. Akira Ishibashi
Japan Institute of Human Factors
Tokyo, JAPAN
Although automated systems in an advanced cockpit have contributed to the enhancement of the safety, they have also
increased the system’s complexity which can be a cause of inappropriate situation awareness (SA). In this paper, a
supportive method for enhancing SA in the highly automated cockpit has been proposed, focusing on the following
two points. One is to support in grasping the situation from a broader perspective which can contribute to the detection
of SA errors and to better understanding of the system’s activities. The other is mitigating additional cognitive burden
by supportive information. For the achievement of both an informative cockpit and the minimum additional cognitive
burden, we explore the interface design for supporting SA in terms of improving information management by assisting
the detection of unexpected conditions in the early stages of risky situation.
Introduction
In recent years, various automated systems have been
introduced to the aircraft’s cockpit, and most normal
operations have increasingly being accomplished
through them. Although the advanced automation has
no doubt contributed to the enhancement of the
aviation safety, it can also be one of the reasons for the
system’s increasing complexity which leads to the
difficulty of maintaining appropriate situation
awareness (SA) [1]. In some of the aviation accidents
involving advanced aircrafts, inadequate SA was an
important cause of breakdown in the human-machine
coordination [2, 3].
In this study, SA in the highly automated cockpit is
assumed to be divided into the following two aspects.
One is grasping the state of an automated system itself.
A source of difficulty in acquiring this SA is the
system’s internal complexity. For example, the
autopilot system has over 20 modes with complex
mode combinations and automatic mode transitions.
Some aviation accidents indicated that the complete
understanding of an autopilot system can sometimes
be difficult even for the highly trained pilot [2, 4]. The
other aspect is SA from a broader perspective
including situation and environmental condition. In
this paper, global SA is used to mean this SA with
bird’s eye view. Global SA is important for greater
understanding of the system’s activities, the projection
of future state and the result, that is “Why is the
system doing that?”, “What will the system do next?”,
“What will the result of the system’s activities be?”[5]
This awareness is essential for achieving the effective
human-machine
coordination.
For
example,
misunderstanding of the consequences of the system’s

activities can cause inappropriate risk perception,
which may result in the delay in taking remedial
actions by pilots.
For supporting the SA concerning the autopilot system
itself, our research group has proposed a method to
support the pilot in detecting possible deviations in
mental models by providing additional information to
enhance SA for the actual state of the autopilot system.
A prototype information display for supporting the SA
has been developed in order to demonstrate the
validity of the proposed method [6].
In the present study, an improved prototype interface
for supporting more global SA based on the previous
approach has been proposed. In other researches, it has
also been pointed out the importance of a more global
SA and various supportive interfaces have been
proposed [7, 8]. Although they have the potential to
the enhance pilot’s SA, the negative aspect of
providing additional support for practical and
effective use, which may lead to increased complexity
of displays or pilots’ cognitive overload, should also
be considered.
Therefore, for satisfying both of the achievement of an
informative cockpit and the mitigation of additional
cognitive burden, we explore the supportive interface
design focusing on the assistance of information
management in the early stages of risky situations.
Basic Models
In this chapter, we discuss models and definitions
which are fundamental to the present study.
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Situation Awareness Error
Some researches have indicated a strong relationship
between SA and mental models, the latter of which are
internal models of systems and environment [9, 10].
Endsley has explained the role of the mental model as
below.
“This
situation
model

Figure 1. Role of goals and mental models in SA
[11] (M. R. Endsley, “Theoretical Underpinnings of
Situation Awareness: A Critical Review”, Situation
Awareness Analysis and Measurement, Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, pp.16, FIG. 1.6.)
captures not only the person’s representation of the
various parameters of the system, but also a
representation of how they relate in terms of system
form and function to create a meaningful synthesis - a
gestalt comprehension of the system state” [11]. Fig. 1
shows the role of mental models in SA by Endsley.
Based on the figure, the mental model affects direct
attention to key features on objective system and
environment for the development of SA, and this
mental model is revised based on the acquired SA. It
means that there is a possibility of going into a kind of
error loop by the use of incorrect mental models. That
is, an inadequate mental model can cause a system
operator to have an erroneous SA as described in Fig.
1, and the operator might not recognize key features
which might indicate the SA error because direct
attention to information is controlled by the mental
model updated directly or indirectly based on
erroneous SA. Such a situation can be critical because
it is considered to be already difficult for the operator
himself to detect the SA error.
However, it also indicates the possibility that an
operator can remedy the SA error himself by detecting
the deviations of the activated mental model from the
actual situation at an early stage of the event. In this

study, our purpose is to support the detection of
inaccuracy in the activated mental model by providing
additional information with less cognitive burden.
Mental Model
According to Rasmussen’s study, the mental model of
a system operator consists of at least two dimensions
which can be represented as hierarchies [12]. One is
the functional hierarchy in line with the dimension of
means-end. The other is the physical hierarchy along
the dimension of parts-whole. In the real aircraft’s
operation, the mental model activated in a pilot’s mind
dynamically changes with the transition of active
goals which are sometimes parallel or conflictive.
Rasmussen stated that the physical and the functional
hierarchy in a system operator’s mental model
dynamically interact with each other at appropriate
representation levels in order to interpret and evaluate
flooding information from the ongoing situation [12].
This operator’s ability to describe the system at the
various physical and functional levels can also provide
a kind of redundancy for grasping situation. Even if an
operator fails to realize the abnormal indication of
gauge, it is possible that the operator can recognize the
SA error by reasoning from the unexpected state of
either a more global system or a lower levels system.
In such a case, the operator recognizes the objective
system at multi-levels of the mental models, which
can provide redundant ways of recognition for the
situation. Therefore, for supporting the redundant
situation recognition, the information concerning the
bird’s eye view of a situation should be displayed at
the same time as the existing indications.
Supporting Method
The importance of supporting global SA has been
indicated, and new displays for supporting it have
been proposed or already come into practical use, e.g.
Vertical Situational Display (VSD). However, it is
necessary to thoroughly consider the trade-off
between their effectiveness and the cognitive burden
in additional supportive information. In fact,
according to a questionnaire survey of 10 commercial
pilots in our previous research, many pilots were
sensitive to increasing the amount of information on
the interface, although they showed an interest in the
possibility of additional supports to acquire the
appropriate SA.
Therefore, the principle of our system design is to provide
minimum additional cues on the interface for helping a
pilot in detecting any inadequacy in the activated mental
model in terms of the most important goal - safety. These
additional cues can be provided as follows:
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•

•
•
•

Operators are NOT obligated to grasp the cues
by excess highlighting or warning sound or
other means. Operation procedure also does not
require operators to do it.
Operators are NOT obligated to respond to the
appearance of cues.
Cues do NOT have excess saliency compared
with other displayed information.
It should be intuitive and easy enough for
operators to acquire the cues and to interpret
their meaning.

The basic concept of our method for displaying
supportive information is in supporting the recognition
of the deviation from expected situation in performing
routine tasks in the early state of risky situation.
Implementation
Based on the discussion in previous chapters, we have
proposed a prototype of the improved Primary Flight
Display (PFD) for the enhancement of SA. Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3 show some examples of the display. The basic
structure of the display is the same as the existing PFD
because pilots are highly accustomed to the existing
form. Some incremental information has been added
in the proposed display.
Firstly, the graphical information of the terrain is
added to the proposed display. The topographic data
comes from a database of existing Enhanced Ground
Proximity Warning System (EGPWS). The graphical
information is adjusted such that the center pointer of
the aircraft symbol indicates the flight path (inside the
circle (a) of Fig. 2 (1)(2)). It means that the aircraft
will fly on in the direction of the center pointer. The
indication can enhance the awareness for the physical

relationship between the terrain, and the current
position and flight path of an aircraft. As the terrain
display are based on the flight path and the range of
visibility is also limited to about 40km (enough to
indicate terrain information for the next few minutes),
the saliency of the terrain display naturally declines
when the information is considered to be less
important, for example, when the aircraft is climbing
or cruising at the high enough altitude as described in
Fig.2(2).
Compared to other terrain displays previously
proposed, the saliency of the terrain indication of this
display is appreciably low. Most part of it is overlaid
by other indicators, giving them the priority. The
reason is that, as the first aim of the terrain indication
is to support the detection of possible error in the
activated mental model which is used for projecting
future situation, minimum information may be enough
to accomplish the aim. In the context of this study, the
error in the activated mental model signifies the
“existence” of causes of danger which may result in a
crash along the flight path which pilots do not expect,
caused by some factors such as the erroneous setting
of the autopilot pilot system which leads to
unexpected sudden descent, or by the pilot’s
misunderstanding of the terrain feature. Therefore, the
indication is enough to represent the relationship
between the flight path and the existence of causes of a
crash. There is no need for the display of detailed land
features. In other words, it provides only some key
features of the information of the aircraft’s flight path
with connection to the physical terrain information,
which can describe the deviation from the pilot’s
expected situation more intuitively than the existing
indications. This kind of global situation display can
contribute to the detection of the possible deviation of

(a)

(a)

(1) descending at 9100feet

(2) climbing at 35500feet
Figure 2. Examples of the proposed display
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the pilot’s mental model from the actual situation.
This, in turn, is useful for evaluating whether the
aircraft will be safe or not in the foreseeable future.
Secondly, the consequence of the activities of
autopilot system is also shown in the proposed display
as described inside the circle (b) in Fig. 3(1). Although
the autopilot system originally consists of lower level
functions or their combinations, such as maintaining
the vertical speed or maintaining the heading, the
proposed display represents the future situation by
describing the function of the autopilot system at a
more global level with connection to the physical
terrain model. For a clearer indication, if the system
detects a possible crash, the symbol is indicated as
shown inside the circle (b) in Fig. 3(2), which is
different from that in a safe situation. This indication
of the intention of the autopilot system can support the
pilot’s more global SA. That is, the pilot can
understand the situation not only at the level of “What
is the system doing?”, but also at the level of “What is
the outcome of the system’s action?” by the indication.
Furthermore, if the system detects a possible crash, a
blue bar which is presented on the altitude indicator
turns invisible (inside the ellipse (c) of Fig. 3(1) and
Fig. 3(2)). The blue bar indicates a result of safety
assessment by the system, and disappearance of the
indication from the display can inform the pilot about
the system’s abandonment of responsibility for safety
when detecting a possible erroneous direction based
on the system’s situation assessment.
These indications described above cannot provide
detailed information like the precise distance or

remaining time to the possible crash. However, the
proposed display can be expected to indicate possible
dangers in its earlier phase by supporting the
recognition of the deviation from the pilot’s expected
situation. In other words, the aim of the proposed
display is to promote the acquisition of necessary
information by the pilots in an earlier time frame,
which can allow the efficient use of more supportive
information like VSD.
In addition, we have explored the use of the
framework of the proposed display which provides
information of a more global situation for a greater
understanding of the system’s direction or intention
especially in the critical situation. We have designed
an enhanced display for TCAS based on the
framework of the proposed display. Symbols of other
aircraft subject to the TCAS advisory are overlaid in
the proposed display described in Fig. 4. In that case,
the pilot is informed of an aircraft which is coming
close to the center pointer, a significant cause of
danger because the center pointer indicates the flight
path. The indication can support a pilot in recognizing
the transition of the degree of danger intuitively.
Therefore, the pilot can decide whether he/she should
follow the TCAS advisory or not earlier. It can
contribute to the proper understanding of the
appropriateness of the TCAS advisory, and to the
avoidance of erroneous decision under severe
time pressure.
The proposed display can clearly indicate the possible
danger of an expected crash in the early stages of the
accident. The function can provide pilots with more

(b)

(c)

(c)

(b)

(1) normal descent

(2) abnormal descent into the terrain
Figure 3. Examples of the proposed display

The aircraft is descending using the autopilot system. In Fig. 3(2), the aircraft has a possibility of crashing into
the terrain because the pilot erroneously directs too low a target altitude to the autopilot system.
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opportunities to recover from errors. It can help to
prevent certain types of CFIT accidents such as the
accident of Air Inter Flight 148 at Strasbourg in 1992,
the accident of Korean Air Flight 801 at Guam in 1997,
because one of the important causes of these accidents
is that pilots could not recognize the situation that the
aircraft was heading to the terrain erroneously.
Although the evaluation of the prototype display is
still ongoing, we believe that the proposed method is
effective for realizing a higher level of safety in the
highly automated system.

(a)

Figure 4. Examples of the proposed TCAS display
The symbol inside the ellipse (a) indicates the relative
altitude, the position, the lateral and vertical direction
of the closing aircraft.

Conclusion
We have developed the prototype interface for
providing supportive information to the pilots. It aims
at providing cue information for detecting possible
deviation of mental model from the real situation. The
great cue has been taken not to increase the cognitive
burden in providing additional information in the
already congested PFD. The importance point of the
proposed interface point of the proposed interface
concept is that it can increase the possibilities that
pilot can recognize the existence of the risky situation
in its early stage. Authors believe that the validity of
the proposed interface concept will be validated by the
experimental evaluations.
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